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APPELLANT/PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Questions 
Opposition for Certiorari 
I. Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect a 
decrease in the rental rate for storage units? 
II. Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the Plaintiff 
for Defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent in 
accordance with law? 
III. The Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review 
the postjudgment actions of the trial court, which actions 
were in accordance with law. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
A PURPORTED MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES EFFECT 
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS WHEN RELIED UPON BY 
THE APPELLANT. 
To fully understand the Respondent's claim of a purported 
"Mistake" an issue of material fact, and the asserted premise from 
which they stand in requesting this Court to deny Certiorari. 
Therefore, affirming reformation of the contract, to a previous rent-
rate in violation of the contractual notification requirements, and 
to affirm enforcement of the Respondent's omitted language in the 
written and required to be signed Rental Agreement as to the 
notification requirements, a required threshold, prior to becoming 
effective, for rent-rate decreases one must import fault upon: 
Either the Appellant, who was required to sign the Rental 
Agreement dated June 12, 1987 (App-42) as a condition of 
renting the Respondent's storage units Nos. 143 and 144, 
or the Respondent who properly noticed the Appellant for 
the appropriate rent-rate decrease to be effective May 1, 
1988f (App-4) and to be effective retroactive for the month 
of October 1988, and to commence on a going forward basis 
from November lf 1988, (App-17), 
for the responsibility of the purported alleged mistake and the 
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Respondent's ignorance of their contractual duties of responsibility 
set forth in their own required-to-be-signed Rental Agreement. Some 
noted authorities, as listed below, discuss the issue of reformation. 
Professor Corbin on Contracts, Chapter 29 $ 615, page 743. 
Dougherty v. Lion Fire Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S. 10 (New York 1903). 
Moreover, the issue of "mistake" is analyzed with great clarity in 
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal. 
1949). 
Applying these rules to the case at bar, no mistake of law is 
claimed. The Second—the Respondent claims in the Attorney's 
prepared and canned Affidavit of Ms. Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 
1989, par. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 (App-5 and 5A), that a mistake was 
made proclaiming knowledge to the Appellant, wherein the Appellant 
would be required, to correct the Respondent's error. The 
Respondent's affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper's Deposition taken dated 
April 29, 1989, clearly controverts and declares under oath just the 
opposite to her Attorney's prepared and canned Affidavit for the same 
day, at the same time, by the same person. (App-6 and 6A) lines 24, 
25, and lines 8 through 13* The Third is the intention grounds 
elaborated in length by the Respondent which does not apply in this 
case under the exception italicized, 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Contracts $ J 135, 144 pages 486-487, and 499. Applying this rule 
to the case at bar the Appellant's documents (App-3, 8, 9, and 10) 
without any response, "just put the copies into the file," (App-6A 
lines 20 and 21) and the Appellant's responses (App-16, and 19 
through 27) without any response renders the Respondent's asserted 
claim of "Mistake" to no mistake in the legal sense. Therefore, no 
reformation is entitled and, of course, no alleged default exists for 
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the period of time May 1988 through September 10f 1988, nor any other 
period of time resulting from the appropriate amortizations that were 
recognized, received, and accepted by the Respondent. See also 
McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 506 (Utah 1952), and Sine v. Harper, 222 
P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 1950). 
ISSUE II 
THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
ALLEGED DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE NOT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
The Respondent has brought to the forefront the Utah Code 
Section 38-8-3, claiming protection and enforcement on the asserted 
premise that there is an established default by the Appellant 
reiterated many times throughout their proclamated claim, Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R at 56 par. 16, 23, and 30). This specifically 
describes the landlord's statutory duties of responsibility that must 
be followed prior to any enforcement action against the tenant, which 
is specifically described in Utah Code Sections 38-8-2, 38-8-3(2), 
and 38-8-3(3). No place in the record is there any compliance with 
these statutory duties of responsibility by the landlord as asserted 
by the affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, Affidavit par, 6 (App-14A) and 
notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud; further 
asserted by the affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper (APP-5 and 5A) and 
notarized by her attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud, for the period 
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period 
of the Appellant's lock-up , or any other period of time prior to the 
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989. 
"There is no question under Otah cases that a violation of 
the duty set by the statutes gives rise to an action for 
damages, not in an action under the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Statutes but as a separate tort." 
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King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1955) . Therefore, the Appellant's 
properly filed counterclaim for trover and conversion, and the 
establishment of the Appellant's lien should not be dismissed with 
prejudice (R at 69). The self-help remedies taken by, and afforded 
to, the Respondent for the alleged Appellant's failure to pay the 
full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and must not be 
denied the Appellant in the Respondent's adamant request for 
Certiorari denial. 
ISSUE III 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE 
POSTJUDGMENT ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ACTIONS WERE NOT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
The Respondent asserts that since the Appellant is acting Pro-
Se in this action, he is not entitled to, or should not be afforded, 
his U.S. Constitutional Rights—so of course, the Court of Appeals 
disregarded and ignored them too, by refusing to review the 
Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement. Nevertheless, that does not 
bind this Court in ignoring them, i.e., the Appellant's U.S. 
Constitutional Rights, whereby the Appellant has been unlawfully 
incarcerated under the color—the alleged Contempt of Court—the 
improperly noticed, the unlawfully claimed, the immediately 
instituted, Supplemental Relief Motion, during the properly noticed 
Oral Arguments for bonding on Appeal September 26, 1989, at 9 a.m. 
See Amended Docketing Statement, and refer to the Respondent's 
admission Post-Judgment Events paragraph No. 11. Then, review the 
secret document and the alluded-to verbal conversations (attached) 
that have been going on between the trial court and Mr. Lynn Pe 
Heward, in conspiring to manipulate (strip the Appellant) with 
unlawful enforcement actions against the Appellant, in violation of 
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appropriate "Notice - Due Process" of his U.S. Constitutional Rights 
14th Amendment. See Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1983), 
Utah Judicial Code Section No. 78-33-8 Supplemental Relief that 
declares " . . . the court shall on reasonable notice . . . " Open 
Court unprepared, unrepresented, does not constitute reasonable 
notice. See also Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 853 (Utah 1981). 
Moreover, the U.S. Constitution 5th Amendment should have protected 
the Appellant in civil actions as pleaded, par Nos. 9 and 10 of 
Amended Docketing Statement. See also First Federal Sav. & Loan. 
Ass'n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). The 
alleged Contempt of Court was illegal too. See Amended Docketing 
Statement Par. Nos. 9 through 16, commingled with Thomas v. Thomas, 
569 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977). There is no question that the 
postjudgment actions were not in accordance with law, and the 
Appellant was unlawfully incarcerated under the color—the alleged 
Contempt of Court—in violation of the law, causing great damages 
upon the Appellant, his spouse, and his children, who continually 
suffer from this reckless and wanton act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons this case should be reversed and 
remanded to trial and a judgment entered in favor of the Petitioner, 
or in the alternative, grant the Petitioner's request for Certiorari. 
Dated this 31 ~~~ day of J^ft/w , 1990. 
Respectfully submitted 
fain*- ^e^m. 
William L. Echols 
Defendant, Appellant and 
Petitioner, Pro-Se 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Appellant/Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Questions Opposition 
for Certiorari was hand delivered to Lynn P. Heward #1479f Attorney 
for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117, on this 31 -^ day of J#/w , 1990. 
The sum of three copies as agreed. 
William L. Echols 
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1 after this had originally happened, because, as I 
2 remember correctly— Like I said, it's been a while— 
3 and if I remember correctly, I did send a letter in 
4 between this that I told Mr. Echols that he was aware 
5 that the rents were supposed to be forty— 
6 No. As a matter of fact, I wrote and told 
7 him there had been a mistake made on the check, because 
8 they sent me the check for $55 and the rent was 
9 supposed to be $80 for the two units. 
10 Q So, as you recall, there was another letter 
11 before this one? 
12 A Yes. There was one other letter that I did 
13 send out. 
14 As a matter of fact, I believe I sent it to 
15 your mother-in-law, if I remember correctly—or to the 
16 address I had on the check. 
17 Q It does refer in this letter--Exhibit 
18 Number 3—apparently, of "...a mistake made on your May 
19 statement which I brought to your attention at the 
20 time I received your mother-in-law's check for $55." 
21 That bringing to the attention would be that prior 
22 letter? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q You did not talk to Mr. Echols personally? 
25 A No, I did not. 
LILLIAN S. HONSAKER - CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84094 
(801) 571-0769 
(ftfip-O 
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1 I met Mr. Echols— Actually, he came in and 
2 paid the rent after we had raised rents, and he did 
3 bring me in a check at that time, 
4 Q And that was the first time you recall 
5 meeting him? 
6 A Yes. That was the first time I had met 
7 Mr. Echols. 
8 Q Did you talk to him after that time? 
9 A No. I never actually talked to him. He 
10 would send me letters back, but I don't recall him 
11 coming in. 
12 Q Personally? Or by phone? 
13 A No. No. 
14 Q Did anything else happen during this time 
15 besides your sending out these two letters? 
16 A No. Except— I'm trying to remember. He 
17 sent me several letters that were telling me I was 
18 not—it was illegal for me to do this type of thing. 
19 And I would just call Becky, who was the 
20 secretary, when I would receive his letters, and just 
21 put the copies into his file. 
22 MR. ECHOLS: What type of thing are you talking 
23 about? 
24 THE WITNESS: Well, you would send me these 
25 letters and you would tell me what I was doing was 
LILLIAN S. HONSAKER - CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84094 
(801) 571-0769 
38-8-2 LIENS 
occupants who are to have access to the facility for the purpose of storing 
and removing personal property. No occupant may use a self-service stor-
age facility for residential purposes. The owner of a self-service storage 
facility is not a warehouseman as used in Subsection 70A-7-102(l)(h). If 
an owner issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document 
of title for the personal property stored, the owner and the occupant are 
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the provi-
sions of this chapter do not apply. 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 171, § 1. 
38-8-2. Lien against stored property — Attachment and 
duration — Search for financing statement pre-
requisite to enforcement of lien. 
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsection 38-8-1(6), is entered 
into between the owner and the occupant, the owner of the self-service storage 
facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have 
a lien upon all personal property located at the self-service storage facility for 
rent, labor, or other charges, present or future, in relation to the personal 
property and for expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses reason-
ably incurred in its sale or other disposition under this chapter. The lien 
attaches as of the date the personal property is brought to the self-service 
storage facility and continues so long as the owner retains possession and 
until any default is corrected, or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or 
the property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien. Before taking enforce-
ment action under Section 38-8-3, the owner shall determine if a financing 
statement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been filed 
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the prop-
erty to be sold or otherwise disposed of. 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-2, enacted by L. rations and Commercial Code" for "in the office 
1981, ch. 171, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 66, § 163. of the lieutenant governor" in the last sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend- tence; and made minor changes in style, 
ment substituted "with the Division of Corpo-
38-8-3. Enforcement of lien — Notice requirements — Sale 
procedure and effect. 
A claim of an owner which has become due against an occupant and which 
is secured by the owner's lien may be satisfied as follows: 
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner until the occu-
pant has been in default continuously for a period of 30 days. 
(2) After the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of 
30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action if the occupant has been 
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or sent by 
certified mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy of the 
notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where 
the self-service storage facility is located. Any lienholder with an interest 
in the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has 
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SELF-SERVICE STORAGE FACILITIES 38-8-3 
knowledge either through the disclosure provision on the rental agree-
ment or through the existence of a validly filed and perfected UCC-1 
financing statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code, or through other written notification, shall be included in the notice 
process as set forth in this section. 
(3) This notice shall include: 
(a) an itemized statement of the owner's claim showing the sum 
due at the time of the notice and the date when the sum became due; 
(b) a brief and general description of the personal property subject 
to the lien, which description shall be reasonably adequate to permit 
the person notified to identify the property; except that any container 
including, but not limited to, a trunk, valise, or box that is locked, 
fastened, sealed, or tied in a manner which deters immediate access 
to its contents may be described as such without describing its con-
tents; 
(c) a notification of denial of access to the personal property, if such 
denial is permitted under the terms of the rental agreement, which 
notification shall provide the name, street address, and telephone 
number of the owner or his designated agent whom the occupant may 
contact to respond to the notification; 
(d) a demand for payment within a specified time not less than 15 
days after delivery of the notice; and 
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the claim is paid within 
the time stated in the notice, the personal property will be advertised 
for sale or other disposition and will be sold or otherwise disposed of 
at a specified time and place. 
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be presumed delivered 
when it is deposited with the United States postal service and properly 
addressed with postage prepaid. 
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in the notice, an adver-
tisement of the sale or other disposition shall be published once a 
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the county where the self-service storage facility is located. The 
advertisement shall include: 
(i) a brief and general description of the personal property 
reasonably adequate to permit its identification as provided for 
in Subsection (3)(b); the address of the self-service storage facil-
ity and the number, if any, of the space where the personal prop-
erty is located; and the name of the occupant and his last known 
address; and 
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the sale or other disposi-
tion, which sale or other disposition shall take place not sooner 
than 15 days after the first publication, 
(b) If there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county 
where the self-service storage facility is located, the advertisement 
shall be posted at least ten days before the date of the sale or other 
disposition in not less than six conspicuous places in the neighbor-
hood where the self-service storage facility is located. 
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal property shall conform 
to the terms of the notice provided for in this section. 
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LYNN P. HEWABD SALT LAKE aTY* OTAH 84117 
TELEPHONE 264-8040 
AHEA CODE 301 
August 14f 1989 
Fourth Circuit Court 
98 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84 003 
Attention: Sue. 
Re: American vs. Echols 
Dear Sue: 
In accordance with our telephone conversation of August 
14, 1989, enclosed please find my check in an indeterminate sum 
not greater than $15 as well as the following documents concerning 
the referenced matter: Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings, 
as well as a stamped envelope and a copy of the Motion and Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings to be used for serving the defendant. 
I would appreciate it if you would please take care of 
the filing and execution of these documents as appropriate, and 
then please return the copies of the Motion and/or Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings to me in the said stamped envelope for 
service on the defendant. 
Thank you for your help and consideration. 
Yours very truly, 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney at Law 
